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Say "Kondratieff" 
In this winter of our discontent, media pun-
dits have examined the entrails of  a hecatomb 
of  economists, but still remain undecided 
about the economic outlook. Some claim that 
the recession is already over, while others 
claim thatthe worst is still ahead of us. In 
view of  this disagreement, it may be useful to 
examine a number of indicators to determine 
what lies ahead in 1982. 
Long waves 
The world of economic theory has led to one 
useful indicator which Alfred Malabre men-
tioned recently in a Wall Street Journal 
column, but which has been evident to 
veteran analysts throughout the past genera-
tion. In a word, the recession reaches bottom 
just at the time when market-letter writers all 
begin to say "Kondratieff". The reference is to 
a theory originally developed in the 1920s by 
the Russian economist Nikolai Dimitriyevich 
Kondratieff. According to this view, econo-
mic history moves in half-century-Iong 
waves, and each wave is generated by the rise 
and fall of  some major industry. This suggests 
that during the downswing of a Kondratieff 
long wave, the normal ups and downs of a 
business cycle are exaggerated -with busi-
ness recoveries being short and mild, and 
recessions being long and severe. 
Economists generally put little stock in the 
Kondratieff thesis. For a recent cover story, 
Forbes magazine obtained quotes from two 
leading MIT economists, with Nobel 
Laureate Paul Samuelson describing the 
thesis as "nonsense", and Charles Kindle-
berger describing it as "astrology". Nonethe-
less, the theory has a following among 
economists with engineering degrees, who 
see most things in terms of sine waves-and 
especially among market-letter writers of the 
gloom-and-doom school, who revive the 
theory during every recession as an explana-
tion of  why the outlook looks so dismal. But 
whatever the value of the thesis, it has pro-
vided more sanguine economists with a 
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useful rule of thumb: the economy begins to 
turn up whenever most financial writers 
describe the outlook in terms of a Kondratieff 
decline. Incidentally, Joseph Stalin did ex-
actly what most policymakers would like to 
do with their economists-he shipped 
Kondratieff off to Siberia. 
Inventory watch 
A better fix on the outlook may be obtained 
by watching  tho~e measures which take into 
account  the  automatic  nature  of business-
cycle forces.  In particular, sales and employ-
ment should begin to improve as business 
firms run-off their present excess inventories, 
and are forced to reorder new materials and 
equipment. Inventory data suggest, however, 
thatthis process is just beginning, and that we 
may be facing a situation similar to the sharp 
inventory cutback which climaxed the 
1974-75 recession (see chart). 
During 1981, businesses added $18 billion of 
inventories-$9 billion of  that total in the 
volatile durable-goods sector-yet the vol-
ume of  durable-goods sales declined 7 per-
cent between the fourth quarter of 1980 and 
fourth quarter of 1981. Even with no further 
decline in sales, substantial inventory liqui-
dation would be needed to restore stocks to 
proper levels. And if  sales weaken further, the 
swing from accumulation in 1981  to liqui-
dation during 1982 will be a substantial near-
term drag on total output of  the economy. 
Still, most economists expect the liquidation 
process to end by about mid-year, leading to 
a new accumulation of inventories-and 
therefore higher orders, sales and employ-
ment-in the second half. 
Automatic stabilizers 
In another almost automatic process, the 
downward spiral should be neutralized by 
the fiscal reforms of  the past generation -the 
automatic reductions in income-tax receipts, 
and increases in unemployment compensa-
tion and social-security benefits, that go 
along with any downturn in production and 
employment. A generation ago, in his role as 
business-cycle analyst, Arthur Burns empha-
sized the automatic stabil izing effects of IF\Bcdl~If@ll  JJ«(~~)~IfW~ 
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Federal-deficit financing on the economy. 
Little did he realize, in his later role as central 
banker, the amount of  deficit financing that 
would be likely in 1982 and later years (see 
chart). 
Most economists believe that massive tax 
cuts and increases in defense spending-the 
key elements in the current fiscal outlook-
should turn the economy around after  .I 
rnid-year. The tax cuts alone are expected to 
pump about $37 billion into the economy 
(annual rate), most of it in the second half of 
the year, after the first of two 1  O-percent cuts 
in income-tax rates takes hold on July 1. 
Increases in defense spending may add $25 
billion in annual spending. And beginning 
July 1, the economy will also get a boost of 
perhaps  $14  billion  in  additional  social-
security payments as a result of cost-of-living 
adjustments. Partly offsetting these injections 
of cash will be further cuts in government 
spending at Federal, state and local levels, as 
well as the January increase in social-security 
taxes. Yet on balance, the overall Federal 
stimulus should be substantial. 
The budget figures indicate also that the 
. inventory decline may be less than generally 
expected. The late-1981 increase in 
inventories, especially in primary metals and 
nonelectrical machinery, may reflect buying 
by business firms in anticipation of a coming 
boost in defense spending. This stock 
accumulation, being planned rather than 
unplanned, suggests that further inventory 
cutbacks (and their depressing effect on the 
economy) rnay be relatively modest. 
Monetary role 
In past business recoveries, the fiscal stimulus 
was supported by an accommodative mone-
tary policy. In the present cycle, however, the 
size of the deficit to be financed could 
unbalance a monetary policy dedicated to a 
slow non-inflationary recovery. Federal 
Reserve Chairman Volcker rnadethis point in 
recent Congressional testimony, when he 
said that consolidating the progress already 
attained on the inflation front will require 
continued restraint on monetary growth. 
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Actually,  given  the  present  level  of M-1 -
currency plus transaction (checkable) 
deposits-and given last year's relatively 
slow money growth, the Fed could live with 
money growth in the upper half of its 2V,-to-
SV,  percent growth range for 1982. This 
would be consistent with an economic 
recovery later this year, but not with the type 
of  sharp rebound experienced in past cycles. 
Market fears of  a clash between a relatively 
restrictive monetary policy and an excessive-
ly easy fiscal policy have helped account for 
an  unprecedented  rise  in  real  (inflation-
adjusted) interest rates, which has badly 
undermined economic activity in recent 
months. With the Federal Reserve's increas-
ingly successful campaign against inflation, 
rnost market observers last year expected 
interest rates to decline substantially. This 
proved not to be the case, however, and by 
last summer, a number of businesses found 
that  they  could  neither  absorb  high  real-
interest costs nor pass thern along to their 
customers. The results were cancellations of 
merchandise orders, massive inventory 
build-ups, business failures, and rising 
unemployment. The recent increase in the 
business prime-loan rate to 16112 or 17 
percent-which meant a real-interest cost of 
about 8 percent annually-testified to the 
continuation of a problem which could 
further undermine the economy.  High real-
interest costs, therefore, could swamp the 
boost to demand expected from this year's tax 
cuts. 
Structural problems 
Long-term structural problems also could 
undermine the recovery process in many 
industries, beginning with the crucial auto-
motive industry. New-car sales, at 9 million 
units in  1981, fell  far below the 11-million-
plus pace in the boom years of  the late 1970s. 
For domestic producers, 1980-81 sales were 
the worst in the past two decades, reflecting a 
sharp upsurge in product costs. The average 
price of  a new Detroit rnodel ($9,000) was 28 
percent higher than two years ago. And 
financing and fuel costs were up consider-
ably more. $Billions 
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In early 1982, Detroit has plans to slash the 
number of units on showroom floors, which 
have again reached record levels with more 
than 100  days' supply on hand, Several major 
producers have again announced sales re-
bates, and also have cut assembly schedules, 
Production is less than as-million annual 
rate, although sales averaged a 6-million 
pace in January, All of these factors help 
explain the severe pressure on the auto-
workers' union to reduce labor costs, which 
are roughly twice as high per car in Detroit 
than on Japanese production lines, 
The housing industry, if anything, exhibits 
even more severe structural problems, Dur-
ing 1981, most statistical series representing 
housing  activity  reached  record  or  near-
record lows-far  below the 1978 peak of 2 
mi  II ion starts -because of high interest rates 
and severely curtailed availability of mort-
gage funds, Most estimates of housing 
demand, derived from population growth, 
exceed  2  million  new  houses  per  year-
which suggests a shortfall of  roughly 600,000 
units in each of  the past three years, Nonethe-
less, there is no indication that that shortfall 
will be overcome any time soon, Record 
interest rates have not only depressed the 
effective demand for new housing, but also 
have devastated the nation's thrift institutions 
and thus dried-up the major source of mort-
gage financing, In contrast, homebuilding 
typically has helped lead the economy out of 
each recession, with housing starts rising as 
lower interest rates improve the availability 
and cost of mortgages, 
A slight uptick recently in home sales, an 
apparent bottoming-out of housing starts, the 
, lowest level of home inventories since 
1971 -and of course the massive shortfall in 
building  during  the  last  several  years-
indicate grounds for a strong recovery in 
1982, Yet real-estate analysts generally 
believe that mortgage rates must decline 
several percentage points-to below 14 
percent-to generate a significant demand 
for mortgage credit and housing, 
The  nation's  basic  industry-agriculture-
also continues to face serious problems in 
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1982, Record large crops, sluggish demand 
for farm products, high interest rates, and a 
stagnant volume of agricultural exports 
limited the recovery of farm incomes and 
created cash-flow problems for the industry 
during 1981, Net farm income last year 
approached $23 billion-4  percent higher in 
real terms than the 1980 total, but largely 
because of a build-up in crop inventories, 
Moreover, reaVincome in both years was not 
much more than half  the 1979 peak figure, 
Many highly-leveraged farm operators last 
year experienced a severe cash-flow 
squeeze, largely because of  high interest rates 
and lower commodity prices, Some of  those 
farmers, however, used the equity accumu-
lated from rapid price appreciation of their 
land to refinance their operations, But in early 
1982 at least, many operators face continued 
downward pressure on prices and incomes 
becauseof large grain stocks and weakening 
demand for various farm products, 
End of recession? 
In a word, structural as well as cyclical prob-
lems now beset some major industries, thus 
providing support to the gloomy Kondratieff 
thesis, Most observers, however, expect a 
cyclical upturn later in the year, on the basis 
of  the automatic processes involved in in-
ventory liquidation and rebuilding, as well as 
the automatic stabilizers working through the 
Federal budget In Malabre's apt phrase, 
recessions (like Wagnerian operas) eventual-
ly do corne to an end, 
The autornatic stabilizers this year will be 
supplemented by outright tax reductions, and 
rnore importantly, by the boost to real in-
comes created by the increaSingly successful 
fight against inflation, The fiscal picture, 
needless to say, has severely destabilizing 
implications given the expectation of sharply 
rising deficits beyond 1982, If  progress can be 
achieved in reducing those deficits, however, 
the Fed's monetary-policy stance gives pro-
mise of a sustainable noninflationary 
recovery-something we have not been able 
to achieve in the last several decades, 
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RANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DlSTRlcr 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Seleded Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
loans (gros5, adjusted) and investments'" 
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.$. Treasury securities'" 
Other securities'" 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Laille negotiable CD'sl 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  l/Defidency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net fr~ reserves (+  l/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,500  6.5 
10,834  8.7 
4,498  12.2 
5,221  10.3 
81  0.3 
564  38.3 
771  I- 11.3 
542  I- 35 
1,556  3.7 
2,129  f- 7.1 
1,477  5.0 
14,432  19.1 
15,070  22.8 
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